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Richard Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. ix + 274. 
Essays in Moral Skepticism brings together twelve essays by Richard Joyce. The collection is divided 
into three parts, each corresponding to the three philosophical themes for which Joyce is best 
known: moral error theory, the evolutionary debunking of morality, and moral fictionalism. The 
terrain covered is impressive; ranging from empirical issues in moral psychology to conceptual 
matters and technical questions in the philosophy of mind and language. But far from giving the 
DSSHDUDQFHRID0RQW\3\WKRQVNHWFK ¶$QGNow for Something Completely DLIIHUHQW· the 
FROOHFWLRQ·V papers hang together in a mutually informative and complementary way. Although 
only one of the essays is new (¶(YROXWLRQ, Truth-7UDFNLQJ DQG0RUDO6NHSWLFLVP·), the reader 
benefits from their combination. -R\FH·Vpurpose-made introduction is additionally helpful in this 
regard, providing the reader with something of a roadmap for the philosophical journey ahead.  
,DPXQDEOHWRDIIRUGDOORI-R\FH·VHVVD\VWKHLUSURSHUSKLORVRSKLFDOGXHKHUH,n the interests 
RIVSDFH,·OO devote my critical energies to one essay from each part, offering small glimpses into 
some of the others along the way.  
Part I·VSDSHUV VKRZFDVHGLIIHUHQWDQJOHVRI-R\FH·Vargument for moral error theory. Error 
theorists are typically cognitivists; they take moral beliefs and assertions to be aiming at truth. But 
they deny that moral beliefs and assertions ever are true. (Or, to put matters more carefully, error 
theorists deny the truth of all moral claims within an important class; for example, positive, 
atomic, first-order, non-tautological ones.) In their view, the world is just not the right way for 
moral terms to refer, or for moral predicates to be literally satisfied. There are, then, no moral 
facts; no facts about what is morally right and wrong, or about what we morally ought or ought 
not to do.  
¶([SUHVVLYLVP0RWLYDWLRQDO,QWHUQDOLVPDQG+XPH·defends a hybrid variety of cognitivism, 
which carves out a place for a conative element in moral judgments ¶7KH $FFLGHQWDO (UURU
7KHRULVW· UDLVHV SUREOHPV IRU VRPH RI WKH HUURU WKHRULVW·V PHWDHWKLFDO ULYDOV³most notably, 
dispositional analyses of moral properties³in an argumentative manner that wears its chutzpah 
on its sleeve. According to Joyce, dispositional theories often fail to build sufficient structure into 
their analyVLVRIPRUDOSURSHUWLHV7KHUHVXOW¶PRUDOJRRGQHVV·RU¶ULJKWQHVV·HWFIDLOVWRUHIHU
and dispositionalists turn out to be budding (though of course unwitting) moral error theorists.  
 ¶0RUDOLW\6FKPRUDOLW\·homes in on the debate between error theorists and success theorists, who 
maintain that moral terms succeed in referring. Far from vindicating moral discourse, Joyce takes 
success theorists to merely vindicate a schmorality: ¶«VRPHWKLQJ bearing a resemblance to a 
PRUDOLW\«EXWZKLFKIDOOVVKRUWRIUHDOO\EHLQJVR· S. These themes are expanded upon in 
¶0HWDHWKLFDO3OXUDOLVP+RZERWK0RUDO1DWXUDOLVPDQG0RUDO6NHSWLFLVPPD\EH3HUPLVVLEOH
3RVLWLRQV·. Here, one finds a less virulent strain of moral error theory than one is used to seeing 
defended by Joyce. Error theorists usually construct their case by identifying what they take to be 
core conceptual commitments of moral discourse. These commitments help to build a kind of a 
job description; they tell us which kinds of objects, properties, or relations there must be in order 
for our moral terms to refer. Joyce is well-known for denying that anything satisfies this job 
description³for him, there is nothing in the world that answers to our ordinary concept of (e.g.) 
moral rightness ,Q ¶0HWDHWKLFDO 3OXUDOLVP· KRZHYHU KH is surprisingly hospitable to the 
suggestion that something may come sufficiently close. Here, Joyce affords serious consideration 
WR/HZLV·VSURSRVDOWKDWWKHUHare imperfect (though still deserving) deservers of our moral 
terms. When confronted with the choice between accepting that nothing is morally right (that is, 
moral error theory) and accepting that properties like moral rightness are not quite as we thought, 
Lewis (1989, p.137) favours the latter, ¶calm and conservative respons[e]·³though he suggests 
that such judgment calls may ultimately come down to ¶a matter of temperament·. Joyce argues 
that there is no fact of the matter as to whether success theorists (e.g., moral naturalists like Lewis) 
or error theorists are correct; each has strong arguments on their side, and each arrives at their 
position via permissible albeit non-mandatory exercises in conceptual precisification. In 
borderline cases such as these, Joyce suggests that we follow Lewis in thinking that our 
philosophical judgment calls come down to a matter of temperament.  
<HW LW·V not clear to me that we ought to take /HZLV·VWDONRI ¶WHPSHUDPHQW·entirely at face 
value (especially given the characteristically whimsical nature of his prose). One suspects that what 
Lewis really had in mind here was philosophical temperament³that is to say, RQH·V background 
philosophical methodology and principles. A general part of Lewis·V RZQ PHWKRGRORJ\ LV WR
proceed on the assumption that our repertoire of everyday (or ¶IRON·) beliefs (e.g., about mental 
states or moral values) are more or less correct. Paired with thiVPHWKRGRORJ\ LV D ¶PD[LPRI
KRQHVW\·¶QHYHUSXWIRUZDUGD«WKHRU\WKDW\RX\RXUVHOIFDQQRWEHOLHYHLQ\RXUOHDVWSKLORVRSKLFDO
and most commonsensical moments· (1986, p.135). Once we shift our attention to /HZLV·VPRUH
general philosophical framework, then, it is far less clear that the conservative response really is 
as optional for him as Joyce makes it out to be; for the conservative response seems to cohere far 
better with /HZLV·V framework than a response which denies a large swathe of WKHIRON·VILUVW-
order moral judgments. As far as this debate is concerned, then, there may very well be a fact of 
the matter regarding which side a particular philosopher with a particular background theory 
ought to take. 7KLVLVQ·WDPLOOLRQPLOHVDZD\IURPWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDW-R\FHKLPVHOIUHDFKHV, but 
it has the virtue of emphasising that even if these are ultimately judgment calls, they may be very 
principled ones.  
Whereas Part I focuses upon the truth of our moral beliefs, Part II raises issues pertaining to 
their justification. ¶7KH2ULJLQVRI0RUDO-XGJPHQW·FDUYHs out an empirical hypothesis concerning 
the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs¶(YROXWLRQ7UXWK-7UDFNLQJDQG0RUDO6NHSWLFLVP·
exploits that hypothesis in service of moral scepticism. (Arguments with this general structure 
often go under the name of ¶HYROXWLRQDU\GHEXQNLQJDUJXPHQWV· According to Joyce, there is an 
empirically respectable story to be told according to which our capacity to form moral beliefs is a 
biological adaptation. But the adaptive utility of our moral beliefs is one thing³their truth is quite 
another. Since we can supply a plausible evolutionary story of our moral belief-forming 
mechanisms which appeals only to their adaptive utility and nowhere to their truth, we should be 
less confident that these belief-forming mechanisms are truth-tracking, and thus, that our moral 
beliefs are indeed true (p.152). Following exposure to this sceptical argument, we should take our 
moral beliefs to be unjustified³at least provisionally.  
Joyce is keen to distinguish his argument from its close relatives. Some debunkers have fairly 
modest ambitions, aiming to show that our moral beliefs are unjustified if we assume a robustly 
realist understanding of moral facts³that is (roughly), if we assume that our moral claims have 
objective or mind-independent truth-conditions. This strain of debunking does not lead to 
wholesale moral scepticism; it is only if we assume realism that scepticism looms. Joyce, by 
contrast, takes his argument to have epistemological bite whether or not moral truths are 
construed realistically. He offers the example of Fred, who forms beliefs about the value of pieces 
of a foreign currency by consulting tea leaves. The truth-conditions for currency-value-claims are 
clearly inter-subjective (being determined via human convention) rather than objective. Yet )UHG·V
beliefs still seem unjustified in light of the non-truth-tracking processes that give rise to them. As 
is the case with objective facts, then, ¶«Vubjectivist/constructivist facts· are the sorts of things 
that our belief-forming mechanisms may be more or less adept at tracking (p.146). 
The foreign currency example serves as a nice analogue for inter-subjectivist understandings 
of moral facts, according to which the truth of moral claims turns on the verdicts of some (actual 
RUK\SRWKHWLFDOVHWRIKXPDQUHDVRQHUV%XWLW·VQRWFOHDUWKDWWKHOHVVRQDSSOLHVLQHTXDOPHDVXUH
to subjectivist understandings. If moral truths are determined by HDFKLQGLYLGXDO·V subjective states 
(such that ¶ƶ-LQJ LVZURQJ· LV WUXH MXVW LQ case subject S believes that ƶ-LQJ LVZURQJ WKHQ LW·V
difficult to see why considerations of the kind that -R\FHUDLVHVVKRXOGOHDGXVWRWKLQNWKDWZH·UH
grossly ineffective at tracking them³DWOHDVWDEVHQWDQ\UHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWZH·UHineffective at 
tracking our own beliefs more generally.  
Joyce is unlikely to be moved by this suggestion. He is at pains to emphasise that LWZRQ·WGR
to merely point towards some conception of moral facts that facilitates an easy escape from 
scepticism. That conception must also be plausible in its own right (p.155). Subjectivism might 
turn out to be true, and moral facts, so construed, might ILQGDSODFHLQWKHGHEXQNHU·VHYROXWLRQDU\
story. BXWUHLQVWDWLQJ¶«HSLVWHPLFMXVWLILFDWLRQUHTXLUHVPRUHWKDQDYDJXH´PLJKWµ· (p.158). One 
must explain how these facts earn a place in the evolutionary story, and motivate the metaethical 
plausibility of subjectivism. Joyce is likely to find himself in good company if he insists that the 
latter is a tall order. But what of naturalist varieties of moral realism, which take moral facts to be 
identical to (objective) natural facts that it would EHLQRQH·VUHSURGXFWLYHLQWHUHVWVWRWUDFN³facts 
about what enhances co-operation, say? Such views carry the promise of establishing a link 
between fitness-tracking and truth-tracking in the moral domain, and they seem more promising 
than subjectivism. In response, Joyce seems content to appeal to the ¶JHQHUDO PHWDHWKLFDO
DUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWPRUDOQDWXUDOLVP·S<HWRQH FDQ·WKHOSEXW wonder just how strong such 
arguments are likely to be³especially given the philosophical ambivalence that Joyce espouses in 
¶0HWDHWKLFDO3OXUDOLVP·. If the choice between moral error theory and moral naturalism really does 
come down to a matter of temperament (as Joyce appears to think), then it seems brash to swiftly 
dismiss the latter as metaethically implausible here. 
The organising themes of Part III are SURMHFWLYLVP DQG ILFWLRQDOLVP ¶3DWWHUQV RI
2EMHFWLILFDWLRQ· H[SORUHV WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ 0DFNLH·V PRUDO HUURU WKHRU\ DQG KLV
¶REMHFWLILFDWLRQWKHVLV·, according to which the apparent objectivity of moral facts arises from our 
tendency to objectify the moral attitudes (e.g., anger, sympathy) that we project onto the world. 
¶0RUDOFLFWLRQDOLVP·VKLIWVWKHIRFXVWROLIHDIWHUPRUDO error theory. Here, Joyce argues that moral 
error theorists ought to preserve moral discourse in the spirit of a useful fiction. More specifically, 
he recommends that we adopt attitudes of make-believe (rather than belief) towards moral 
propositions, and pretend to assert (rather than assert) them. The motivations for fictionalism are 
two-fold. The first is epistemic; unlike beliefs, ILFWLRQDOLVWDWWLWXGHVDUHQ·WRQWRORJLFDOO\FRPPLWWLQJ
and so, being a moral fictionalist need not involve believing any error-ridden moral propositions. 
The second motivation is practical; moral thought is said to provide us with a number of desirable 
practical goods. In particular, Joyce argues that moral thinking serves as a useful bulwark against 
weakness of will; we are more likely to resist temptation and act in accordance with our (long-
term) practical interests when we enlist moral concepts in our deliberations.  
 Joyce distinguishes his brand of moral fictionalism from the ¶SUHIL[· YDULHW\ 7KH ODWWHU 
recommends adopting attitudes of belief towards moral propositions that are prefixed by a(n 
explicit or implicit) story operator. (For example, ¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKHPRUDOILFWLRQLWLVZURQJWR
VWHDO·.) Joyce offers a number of considerations against prefix moral fictionalism. Among these is 
the complaint that prefix fictionalism is unable to accommodate the validity of moral arguments 
such as:  
P1. If my cousin is an infant, then it is wrong to kill my cousin 
P2. My cousin is an infant 
C. Therefore, it is wrong to kill my cousin.  
(Joyce frames this part of his discussion in terms of colour fictionalism. But since he clearly takes 
the problem to generalise, I reframe things in terms of moral fictionalism here.) According to 
Joyce, the prefix fictionalist faces a dilemma. On the one hand, she might take only sentences 
containing moral terminology (P1 and C) to be prefixed by a fictional operator ¶DFFRUGLQJWo the 
PRUDO ILFWLRQ«·. The problem with this move is that the argument is no longer valid. 
Alternatively, she might prefix all three claims with a fictional operator. This maintains validity, 
but Joyce complains that it is utterly unmotivated; why think that the moral fiction will include 
any FODLPVDERXWWKHDJHRIVRPHRQH·VFRXVLQ? 
It seems to me that the prefix moral fictionalist should simply take the second horn. It is, after 
all, commonplace that some things that are true in fictions are true in real life as well. We very 
often import truths about the actual world into fictional stories. We typically hold fixed, for 
example, logical and mathematical truths, the laws of physics, and perhaps even generalisations 
about human psychology. (Fictions are also governed by rules of export, of course; people often 
OHDUQ IDFWV DERXW WKH SDVW IURP JUHDW ZRUNV RI OLWHUDWXUH ,W GRHVQ·W VHHP WR EH SDUWLFXODUO\
problematic for the prefix fictionalist, then, if some things that are true in the moral fiction³the 
DJHRIVRPHRQH·VFRXVLQVD\³are true in real life as well. 
As was noted at the outset, the terrain covered in Essays in Moral Skepticism is impressive. There 
really is something for just about everyone with an interest in metaethics. The collection would 
be of particular interest to those seeking to reject a sceptical metaethical package. Here, they will 
find a systematic and well-supported one to reckon with.  
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